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293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961)
United States v. Holt
12 U.S.C.M.A. 471, 31 C.M.R. 57 (1961)
Two recent cases have applied a federal statute prohibiting obscenity
in the mails, 18 United States Code section 1461,1 to letters of private com-
munication. The pertinent parts of that section are:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article,
matter, thing, device, or substance ... is declared to be nonmail-
able matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier....
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery anything de-
clared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the
same from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing
thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall
be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both for the first offense .... 2
In Ackerman v. United States3 the defendant was a writer and literary
agent who claimed to be engaged in research on lesbianism and homosex-
uality. In the course of his research, Ackerman sent correspondence to one
R. W. Hearn, a married father of two children, whom he believed to be a
homosexual. The defendant was convicted on several counts of having mailed
letters which were "obscene, lewd, indecent, lascivious and filthy in viola-
tion of Title 18 section 1461 of the United States Code." 4 The court found
that the contents of the letters were "obscene matter" within the meaning
of the statute and that it was improbable that such letters had any connec-
tion with a serious research project. Defendant claimed that the social evil
at which the statute was aimed was not involved in this case and that the
evidence was insufficient to establish the requirement of scienter.5
In the case of United States v. Holt0 the Court of Military Appeals
I Federal Mail Obscenity Statute, 69 Stat. 183, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1955).
2 Ibid.
3 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961).
4 Id. at 450.
5 Ackerman v. United States, supra note 3, at 450, 451. Many crimes require that
the element of scienter be present in order for the conviction of a crime. Scienter
means that the accused knowingly did the action for which he is charged. In the
Ackerman case where the element of scienter was claimed by defendant to be lacking,
the court felt without too much explanation, that the evidence supported the notion
that the requirement of scienter had been fulfilled. It has been held in past cases that
if in fact the letters are obscene and if the sender knew of the contents at the time
of sending it, his own belief that the material is not obscene is immaterial. See
Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57, 62 (1906).
6 12 U.S.C.M.A. 471, 31 C.M.R. 57 (1961).
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reviewed the Board of Review's decision to set aside defendant's plea of
guilty to the charge of mailing obscene and lewd letters to a thirteen-year-
old girl. The accused was a thirty-one-year-old married man who had been
separated from his wife and who claimed to be in love with the addressee
of the letters. It was conceded that by any applicable standards the letters
were obscene, but to escape conviction under the statute the accused's
counsel claimed that a private personal love letter is not "matter" within
the meaning of the federal obscenity statute. Defendant's counsel also
claimed that "private communications between two people who have a close
and personal relationship is not matter within the meaning of the statute."7
The court reversed the Board of Review and found that the defendant should
be convicted.
In Holt the court held that a personal relationship between the parties is
not sufficient to take a letter out of the operation of the statute.8 The court
based its holding on several decisions which do not say this directly, but
which the court felt could be implied from their silence on that point.9
Perhaps the court is going too far in making generalizations on the basis of
what the courts do not say in these decisions. The courts have often been
criticized for implying rules or doctrines from the silence of the legisla-
ture.10 The same might be said about obtaining implications from another
court's silence on a particular matter. Since the legislature does not legis-
late by remaining silent, so also is it doubtful that courts decide issues by
what they do not say. One can readily see the danger involved should such
means be used to interpret criminal statutes.
The most important problem raised by the two cases is whether or not
personal letters are to be included within the meaning of the statute. Both
courts referred to the legislative history of the statute, which in its original
form in 1876 did not include letters and was construed as not to include
them; but an 1888 amendment included the word "letters."" In 1955 the
statute was again amended by substituting more general terms such as article,
matter, thing, device or substance for the specific items such as book,
pamphlet, picture, paper, and letter. It was stated in the Senate report that:
the purpose of the proposed legislation is to enlarge section 1461
7t Id. at 473.
8 United States v. Holt, supra note 6, at 474.
9 Sinclair v. United States, 338 U.S. 908 (1950), husband-wife; Thomas v. United
States, 262 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1959), lovers; United States v. Wroblenski, 118 Fed.
495 (1902), mother-son. In these cases there existed a close relationship between the
sender and recipient of the letters involved. No mention is made by the court in
these cases as to the existing relationships having a bearing on the outcome. From this
silence, some courts have concluded that closeness of relationship has no affect in
taking parties out of the control of the statute.
10 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946); United States v. South-
eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944); Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946). These cases reject the notion that Congress legislates
by remaining silent.
11 Ackerman v. United States, supra note 3, at 452, 453.
[Vol. 23
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
of Title 18 of the United States Code so as to include within the
prohibition of said section all matter of obscene nature, whether
or not said matter had fallen within the more restricted definition
contained in the statute.'2
This purpose has since been reaffirmed in Thomas v. United States
where the court said:
In analyzing the foregoing legislative history . . . , it is readily
apparent that Congress intended to amend section 1461 so as to
include within the prohibition of the statute any and all matter
of an obscene ... nature, and it is further apparent that Congress,
by the amendment, had no intention of withdrawing from the
operation of the statute a filthy letter sent through the United
States Mails.13
As to any possible constitutional question, the issue has been decided
since Roth v. United States. In deciding whether or not obscenity came
within the protection of the first amendment, the court said:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
. . . have the full protection of the guaranties .... But implicit
in the history of the first amendment is the rejection of obscenity
as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . We hold
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press.14
Even though legislative history and subsequent interpretation of the
Federal Mail Obscenity Act indicate that all types of obscene material are
subject to punishment, it is questionable whether there is a need to
extend the law to include private communications. It should be noted that
while Roth made a general pronouncement against all obscene matter, the
case actually dealt with a commercial publication. While the legislative
history indicates a desire to expand the statute, it would seem the real
aim of the statute has been exceeded. Section 1461 of the criminal
code was enacted to prevent people from using the mails to corrupt pub-
lic morals. It has been felt that the increase in juvenile delinquency is
due in great part to the wide use of obscene matter within the mails.
The purpose of broadening the statute by the amendment is to combat
the general corruption of the public moralsYin While this seems an ad-
mirable purpose, it has not been fully proven that obscenity in fact tends
to increase juvenile delinquency. Experts' opinions conflict on this point.
In an article reviewing and discussing the latest decisions on obscenity, it
was said "it is not unlikely that none of the justices takes the evils of
obscenity very seriously. Yet, as responsibly placed men, they cannot . . .
say so.''16
12 S. Rep. No. 113, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
13 Thomas v. United States, 262 F.2d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1959).
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956).
15 S. Rep. No. 113, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
16 Kalven, "Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity," in The Supreme Court Review
45 (1960).
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However, assuming for the present that the purpose of suppressing
obscenity is a valid one, the language of the legislative history seems to
indicate a desire to protect the public but not any one individual, who
because of a close or private relationship may be the recipient of an
obscene letter. Even though the word "letter" was included in prior
statutes, one wonders whether it was meant to include private letters as
opposed to letters sent to unknown recipients through a general mailing.
Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates specifically that
the statute was to include private letters. If the statute had been written
expressly to apply to private letters, it is questionable whether in balanc-
ing the government's interest in protecting the morals and welfare of the
people as opposed to an individual's freedom of speech and right of
privacy, such an act would be constitutional. Yet the courts have been
willing to extend the present statute to include such a meaning.
The government under the Constitution may not dictate what we may
say to our friends in private conversations, but the government may stop
us from speaking to the general public where our words may present a
clear and present danger. 17 It would seem on the same basis that a pro-
hibition may be well founded if obscenity will affect the morals of a
group, but that a line should be drawn where people are corresponding
privately. Limits must be set if we hope to preserve the basic freedoms
we so faithfully advocate.
17 Feiner v. People of State of New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). In this case
the Supreme Court held that where a speaker in a public place urged the people
present into conflicting groups so that there was a possibility of a riot, interfered with
traffic, and disobeyed police requests to stop speaking, there was no violation of
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution when such speaker was
convicted of disorderly conduct.
